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LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR CHANGE
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ABSTRACT
Over the past several decades, the law has evolved considerably in the area
of transgender rights. In this Article, the Authors introduce the legal issues
surrounding legal change of gender for transsexual individuals, looking to
current social science, past case law, and general constitutional principles for
guidance. The Authors also examine the political and practical implications of
a proposed regime for change of gender petitions for transsexuals in Alaska.
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INTRODUCTION
In Alaska, as in many states, courts are seeing an increased number
of petitions for change of gender.1 These petitions are similar to the
routine change of name petitions courts have seen for years, yet they
carry with them a tremendous potential for political controversy.2 At the
moment, Alaska’s trial courts have little guidance as to how to rule on
these petitions. As a result, some petitions have been denied outright,
while others have been considered but with inconsistent legal standards.
This Article was written with an eye toward helping Alaska’s courts to

1. Correspondences with the Clerks of Court in Anchorage, Fairbanks,
Juneau, and Palmer have confirmed that petitions for change of gender have no
individual CourtView code (CourtView is the case management software used
by the Alaska Court System), which makes it difficult to pinpoint when change
of gender petitions first appeared in Alaska courts or how the frequency of
petitions has changed over time. Informal interviews with Alaska Superior
Court judges, however, have suggested that although these petitions are still
relatively infrequent, their numbers have grown in recent years.
2. Although these petitions do not appear to be on the political radar at the
moment in Alaska, transgender rights have been hotly debated in Anchorage in
the context of whether people should be allowed to discriminate against
transgendered individuals when making housing and employment decisions.
See infra Part III.A. Many of the arguments against extending anti-discrimination
protections to the transgender community express a sentiment at odds with
granting gender change petitions. See generally http://sosanchorage.com, and
especially Pastor Prevo’s short opinion piece Any Man Can Put on a Dress and
Walk into the Ladies’ Restroom, available at www.sosanchorage.com/information/
ANY MAN CAN PUT ON A DRESS AND WALK INTO THE LADIES.pdf. If a
court granted a transgender woman a legal gender change, she would be
entitled to use a public ladies’ restroom with or without the protections of an
anti-discrimination ordinance. Therefore, it seems likely that, should gender
change petitions gain political attention, Pastor Prevo, who has been described
as the leader of the opposition to the anti-discrimination ordinance, would likely
oppose such a petition, as would those who share his beliefs. See Megan
Holland, Gay Rights Measure’s Changes Criticized by Both Sides, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, June 18, 2009, at A1.
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understand the issues behind the controversy, to process the petitions in
a manner consistent with state precedent, and to explore the practical
and legal effects of such decisions.
Most people take for granted the privilege of having legal
identification that matches the gender that they present to the world.
When most individuals travel by airplane, purchase alcohol, vote, or
apply for a job, bank account, or apartment rental, they are not treated
with mistrust because their identification documents indicate a
mismatch between the gender they were legally assigned at birth and
the one they live as an adult. Not everyone shares this privilege. Having
identification that matches lived gender is “incredibly vital[,] as one’s
legal gender designation has the potential to impact many areas of life:
the ability to marry, the ability to travel, the ability to inherit, insurance
coverage, one’s enrollment in the draft, where one might be
incarcerated, and more.”3 For many transgender individuals, the only
way to obtain identification that matches their lived gender is through a
complete surgical reconstruction of their genitals, which is collectively
referred to as sexual reassignment surgery (SRS). These surgeries carry
risks, are expensive, and often require extended recovery periods.4
The decision each state has to make regarding the procedure for
obtaining a legal gender change has been and will continue to be
informed by impassioned stances on both sides of the argument. As
with any civil rights issue, the debate centers on the pull between
individual human rights and society’s sense of social stability and order.
On the one hand, “[i]f a person does not have identification that
accurately reflects his or her social gender, that person is put in a
position of potential danger on a daily basis and may be forced to live
on society’s margins because of an inability to obtain gainful
employment, credit, or bank accounts.”5 On the other hand, most of us
view gender as one of the salient categories which we use to structure
and make sense of our own identities and our interactions with each
3. Spencer Bergstedt, Estate Planning and the Transgender Client, 30 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 675, 680 (2008).
4. See, e.g., Kristin Wenstrom, Comment, “What the Birth Certificate Shows”:
An Argument To Remove Surgical Requirements from Birth Certificate Amendment
Policies, 17 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 131, 140–41 (2008) (“These surgeries may be
prohibitively expensive, some cost over $70,000 and very few medical insurance
providers cover such surgeries in their plans. . . . Many [choose] not to have
surgery due to the risks of complications, the painful and extended recovery
period, and the reduction of erotic sensation. . . . A requirement that an applicant
have undergone genital surgery is especially burdensome for transgender men. .
. . A recent study found that only three percent of [female-to-male transsexuals]
pursue genital surgery due to the costs, limitations of the procedure, as well as
the medical risks associated with it.”).
5. Id. at 681.
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other. Social categories are only salient, however, to the extent they have
garnered social consensus. Thus, many people are uncomfortable with
the fact that gender is not universally perceived as a fixed characteristic.
For a state to adopt laws that reflect a perception of gender as something
that is changeable would be to undermine a pillar upon which many
have constructed their worldview. When the debate is framed in this
way, it is easy to see why considerable controversy exists regarding the
rights and liberties of transgender individuals.
Alaska’s courts and lawmakers will have to decide where they
stand on the continuum of individual rights. Where to draw the line is
rarely an easy decision. The public can make its view known through
voter initiatives and lobbying.6 The Alaskan judiciary, however, is in the
interesting position of being the interpreter of what is arguably the most
fiercely individual-rights-protective constitution of any in the United
States. Alaskan jurisprudence, like the historical sentiment in the state at
large, has long been “grounded upon such basic values as the
preservation of maximum individual choice, protection of minority
sentiments, and appreciation for divergent lifestyles.”7 As this Article
will show, Alaskan precedent suggests that it is appropriate for courts to
require some showing of a petitioner’s intention to live permanently as
the desired gender before approving a change of gender petition.8 That
precedent further suggests, however, that a requirement of certain
sexual reassignment surgeries is not an appropriate legal standard for
Alaskan courts to apply.9
Over the past several decades, the law has evolved considerably in
the area of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (GLBT) rights.10 This
6. See infra Part III.A., regarding the Anchorage Ordinance debate.
7. Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 169 (Alaska 1972).
8. Because gender change petitions have not been directly addressed by the
Alaska Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, Alaska trial courts
have a substantial amount of discretion in deciding what constitutes proof of
permanency. This Article strives to outline several approaches being used in the
United States and abroad, for the purpose of providing a reference for Alaska
courts.
9. There are many surgeries that fall within the category of sexual
reassignment surgery. Requiring some of those surgeries, such as phallus
construction for a female-to-male individual, before a change of gender petition
will be granted, appears to be more punitive than functional. It is the position of
this Article that Alaskan precedent disfavors the use of such surgeries as a
barrier to legal gender change. See infra Part IV.
10. For the evolution and recognition of civil and constitutional gender
rights, see such cases as Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that an
amendment to the Colorado Constitution banning laws that offered protections
to the GLBT community violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that the
Texas statute criminalizing certain intimate sexual conduct between same-sex
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Article focuses on the specific legal arguments surrounding legal change
of gender for transsexuals and draws from current social science and
general constitutional principles for guidance. The courts do not operate
in a vacuum, so this Article also explores the practical consequences of
the choices to be made regarding the change of gender issue.

I. PETITIONS FOR GENDER CHANGE: AN OVERVIEW
As the legal rights of the GLBT community evolve in the law, so do
the recognized rights of transsexual individuals. Many states have
adopted statutes that allow a person to petition for a change of gender.11
Alaska, in contrast, does not have any specific statute providing a
vehicle for official gender change. To show how Alaska’s courts have
applied the law to transgender Alaskans seeking a court-ordered gender
modification, this Article follows one Alaskan gender change petitioner,
to whom the Authors have given the pseudonym “Jane.”
A.

Terminology

Understanding transgender issues requires some familiarity with
certain terminology. In our case study, Jane is a transsexual.
Transsexuals “identify themselves as transgendered.”12 A transgender
individual expresses his or her gender “in ways incongruous with the
sex . . . to which [he or she was] assigned at birth.”13 Jane asked for a
court order changing her gender as part of her transition from male to
female.

persons violated the federal and state Equal Protection Clauses and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); and, most recently in Alaska,
Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781 (Alaska 2005) (holding that
the absolute denial of benefits to public employees with same-sex domestic
partners was not substantially related to the asserted governmental interests and
violated the plaintiffs’ right to equal protection under the Alaska Constitution).
11. See, e.g., In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 83 (Md. 2003) (“It appears that 22 states
and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes expressly enabling a person
who has undergone a change in gender to have his or her birth certificate
amended to reflect the change.”); Bergstedt, supra note 3, at 682 (“Currently,
twenty-five states and the District of Columbia authorize an amendment to birth
certificates by statute.”); Wenstrom, supra note 4, at 132 n.2 (2008) (noting that,
whether by statute or extension of common law, “[f]orty-eight states allow for
amendment of the gender designation on the birth certificate.”).
12. Jennifer M. Albright, Gender Assessment: A Legal Approach to
Transsexuality, 55 SMU L. REV. 593, 594 (2002).
13. Id. (citing JASON CROMWELL, TRANSMEN & FTMS: IDENTITIES, BODIES,
GENDERS & SEXUALITIES 23, Univ. of Illinois Press (1999); see also Albright, supra
note 12, at 594 (“Transsexuals desire to adopt the opposite gender role and bring
their biological sex in conformity with the adopted gender role.”).
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The difference between “sex” and “gender” is an important
distinction when assessing whether a court should order that a person’s
gender be legally changed. “Sex” often “denotes anatomical or biological
sex,” while “gender” refers to “a person’s psychosexual individuality or
identity.”14
B.

Jane’s Story15

Jane was born anatomically male but has always identified more
with the female gender. As an adult, she decided to present herself to
the world as a woman. Because the gender marker on her legal
documents does not match her lived gender, she has had tremendous
difficulty with basic activities such as obtaining employment outside of
the home, and she runs the risk of being accused of fraud, denied
services, humiliated, attacked, and subjected to harassment.16
Alaska’s statute governing amendments to birth certificates is
ambiguous as to gender amendment procedure,17 but in practice gender
amendments will be honored when submitted to the Bureau of Vital
Statistics with a court-ordered gender reassignment.18 Thus, Jane
petitioned the court for a change of gender order so that she could
obtain legal identification documents with gender designations
matching her lived gender.
Jane has undergone permanent hair removal procedures to her face
and chest. She took female hormones that resulted in changes to the
texture of her skin and hair, substantial growth of breast tissue, and a
redistribution of fat in her body, which had the effect of giving her a
slimmer waistline. She experienced depression prior to commencing the
hormone therapy, but her depression decreased during the course of
hormone treatments. The hormone therapy also caused changes to her
male genitalia, and she now has little ability to maintain an erection.
Jane also altered the way she dresses and now lives as a woman fulltime.
14. Heilig, 816 A.2d at 72 n.4.
15. This is an anonymous account of a real person’s story based on a case
study from an Alaska trial court.
16. Wenstrom, supra note 4 at 135–36.
17. ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.290. Although the statute governs birth certificate
amendments generally, it does not address whether gender amendment is
allowed or what procedure is required.
18. See Sources of Authority to Amend Sex Designation on Birth Certificates,
http://www.lambdalegal.org/our-work/issues/rights-of-transgender-people/
sources-of-authority-to-amend.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (“Alaska has a
general regulation providing for the change of information on birth certificates.
As with changes of name, changes of sex will be recognized with a court
order.”).
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Jane has always considered herself a woman, and her family
accepts her gender as female. She did marry a woman, years ago, in an
effort to conform socially to a male role. Jane’s spouse, a biological
woman, has accepted Jane’s gender as female, and the couple plans to
remain married. Jane intends to follow through with genital gender
reassignment surgery once she has saved enough money. Jane was
diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder, but has no other evident
mental health issues. Indeed, her therapist reported that Jane was able to
operate as a well-adjusted female biologically, socially, and emotionally,
both at home and in the community.

II. A DIVIDED COUNTRY: COMPETING POLICIES
A.

Differing State Policies

Many states with statutes or regulations for gender amendments to
birth certificates discuss gender change procedure in the same code or
regulation that also governs name change procedure.19 Alaska has a
statute governing birth certificate amendments, and, while it specifies
name change procedure, it is silent as to gender amendments.20 At least
twenty-five states and the District of Columbia do have statutory
schemes for birth certificate amendments, and some states issue
amended or new birth certificates despite their lack of statutory
guidelines.21 Of the states that have a gender change petition policy,
whether by statute or by administrative regulation or policy, nearly all
require sexual reassignment surgery before granting a petition.22 In fact,
19. See Bergstedt, supra note 3, at 682 n.3 (recording a list of state statutes
addressing legal gender change procedure, many of which discuss name change
procedure as well).
20. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.290.
21. For a compilation of gender change statutes, see Bergstedt, supra note 3,
at 682 n.3 (“Ala. Code § 22-9A-19(d) (2006); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-326(A)(4)
(2003); Ark. Code Ann. § 20-18-307(d) (2005); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 103425
(West 2006); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-2-1154(4) (2001); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-42(a)
(2007); D.C. Code Ann. § 7-217(d) (2001); Ga. Code Ann. § 31-10-23(e) (2006);
Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 338-17.7(a)(4)(B) (LexisNexis 2008); 410 Ill. Comp. Stat.
535/17(1)(d) (2005); Iowa Code Ann. § 144.23(3) (2005); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
213.121(5) (West 2007); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:62(A) (2001); Md. Code Ann.,
Health-Gen. § 4-214(b)(5) (LexisNexis 2005); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 46, § 13(e)
(2006); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.2832(1) (West 2001); Mo. Ann. Stat. §
193.215(9) (West 2004); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-604.01 (2003); N.H. Code Admin. R.
Ann. He-p. §7007.03(e) (2004); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:8-40.12 (West 2007); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 24-14-25(D) (West 2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-118(b)(4) (2007); Or. Rev.
Stat. § 432.235(4) (2007); Utah Code Ann. § 26-2-11(1) (2007); Va. Code Ann. §
32.1-269(E) (2004); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 69.15(4)(b) (West 2003).”).
22. See id.
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many states require a petitioner to submit an affidavit from the surgeon
who performed the surgery to verify that the surgery is complete and
irreversible.23
The extent to which individuals are required to undergo surgery
varies from state to state. Females transitioning to males (FTMs) are
sometimes able to get a changed birth certificate after either a
hysterectomy or a male chest reconstruction surgery.24 Breast
augmentation for males transitioning to females (MTFs) will not satisfy
the requirement for SRS,25 but in some states the removal of the testicles
for MTFs may constitute SRS and thus allow for a birth certificate
amendment.26 Arguably, surgical reassignment requirements are only
appropriate when the surgeries are desirable and affordable. Many
transgender people, however, and especially FTMs, decide not to have
genital surgery because the procedures are cost prohibitive or because
the result may not be aesthetically pleasing.27
The way states physically handle birth certificate changes also
varies. “Some states issue new birth certificates with all the old
information removed, while some merely amend them by striking out
the old information and writing the new information in the margins.”28
Some states do not have settled policy on whether a person may amend
his or her birth certificate. In South Carolina, for example, there exist no
ordinances, judicial precedent, or statutes regarding gender amendment
to the birth certificate.29 A few states have full prohibition on gender
change for birth certificates.30 Practical realities for immigrants can be
grim. For them, the change of birth certificates and other government
documents depends on the regulations of their home country.31
23. Id. at 682.
24. Id. “However, even where a birth certificate has been changed, the
absence of a phalloplasty or metoidioplasty may be enough to successfully
challenge the validity of a marriage.” Id. at 682 n.36; see also Kantaras v.
Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); In re Marriage of Simmons,
825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
25. Bergstedt, supra note 3, at 682 n.36.
26. Id.
27. See Jean Tobin, Against the Surgical Requirement for Change of Legal Sex, 38
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 393, 401 (2006–2007) (“Some find the results of available
surgical techniques unsatisfactory in light of the high cost, painful recovery, and
risks of complications and diminished sensation. Transsexual men in particular,
owing to the less advanced state of female-to-male SRS, undergo it much less
frequently than trans women.”); see also Bergstedt, supra note 3, at 682 (“Many
FTMs opt not to have genital surgery because of the cost or lack of aesthetic
quality.”).
28. Bergstedt, supra note 3, at 683.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 683–84.
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Courts in other jurisdictions, such as Australia, have called gender
self-determination a right,32 and the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) has directly pegged gender self-determination as an act within
an individual’s fundamental right to privacy.33 “[T]he ECHR’s gender
recognition jurisprudence has emphasized the individual’s ‘freedom to
define herself [or himself] as a female [or male] person.’ The ECHR
identifies this freedom as an aspect of the right to private life under the
European Convention . . . and characterizes it as ‘one of the most basic
essentials of self-determination.’”34
B.

Heilig, A Guiding Light?

The Maryland Court of Appeals decision In re Heilig35 is still the
only example known by the Authors of a court attempting to fashion a
law for gender change out of general principles of common law, current
social science, and its state’s incomplete but limiting statute. The Heilig
court identified seven factors, saying “[t]here is a recognized medical
viewpoint that gender is not determined by any single criterion, but that
the following seven factors may be relevant . . . .”36 The seven factors set
forth are:
(1) Internal morphologic sex (seminal vesicles/prostate[,] or
vagina/uterus/fallopian tubes); (2) External morphologic sex
(genitalia); (3) Gonadal sex (testes or ovaries); (4) Chromosomal
sex (presence or absence of Y chromosome); (5) Hormonal sex
(predominance of androgens or estrogens); (6) Phenotypic sex
(secondary sex characteristics, e.g. facial hair, breasts, body
type); and (7) Personal sexual identity.37
The Heilig court operated within the constraints of its own
legislative guidelines. The Maryland statute that the Heilig court applied
required a court to issue an order which specifically found that “the sex
of an individual born in this State has been changed by surgical
procedure . . . .”38 The court noted that the legislative history for the
enactment of this statute indicated that the applicant must have had a
sex change operation.39 However, neither the statutory text nor
32. See Jean Tobin, supra note 27, at 426.
33. Id. at 425.
34. Id.
35. 816 A.2d 68 (Md. 2003).
36. Id. at 73.
37. Id.
38. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 4-214(b)(5) (2005); see also Heilig, 816
A.2d at 82.
39. Heilig, 816 A.2d at 83.
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legislative history specified the precise nature or extent of the required
procedure.
While limited in its holding by this legislation, the Heilig court
discussed at length how gender is not merely a function of surgical
sexual reassignment. The opinion includes a lengthy discussion of the
social science treatises discussing the aspects of gender identity.40 After
surveying the field of social science articles, the court summarized: “The
ultimate conclusion of such studies, which, as noted, is the central point
sought to be made by transsexuals, is that the preeminent factor in
determining gender is the individual’s own sexual identity as it has
developed in the brain.”41 In its conclusion of this survey of the relevant
treatises, the Heilig court quoted from one study in particular, as follows:
In the end it is only the children themselves who can and must
identify who and what they are. It is for us as clinicians and
researchers to listen and to learn. Clinical decisions must
ultimately be based not on anatomical predictions, nor on the
‘correctness’ of sexual function, for this is neither a question of
morality nor of social consequence, but on that path most
appropriate to the likeliest psychosexual developmental
pattern of the child. In other words, the organ that appears to
be critical to psychosexual development and adaptation is not
the external genitalia, but the brain.42
The Heilig court noted that while most states with legislation
allowing gender change require irreversible surgical procedures, a
minority of states, including Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin, do not
specifically require that any irreversible procedure or surgery be
undertaken.43
This discussion is particularly instructive. It suggests that in the
absence of legal constraints from the legislature or the appellate courts,
courts need not find all of the Heilig factors in order to acknowledge a
petitioner’s change of gender.
C.

Applying Heilig to Jane

With Heilig as a guide, how do the change of gender factors apply
to Jane? Jane has not undergone sexual reassignment surgery but plans
to do so as soon as it is economically feasible. She underwent numerous
40. See generally id. at 71–89.
41. Id. at 77.
42. Id. (quoting William Reiner, To Be Male or Female—That is the Question,
151 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 224, 225 (1997)).
43. Id. at 84 n.8.
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hormonal and surgical procedures in her transition from male to female.
She was diagnosed as having Gender Identity Disorder and has
completed counseling to address how best to live as a woman, despite
contrary biological realities.
Because Jane lacks the requisite SRS, she would be denied her
change of gender petition in most jurisdictions. However, if she were in
a jurisdiction that applied the Heilig factors, her petition might be
granted if the last three factors (hormonal sex, phenotypic sex, and
personal sexual identity) were weighted more significantly than the first
four factors (internal morphologic sex, external morphologic sex,
gonadal sex, and chromosomal sex). With respect to hormonal sex
(criterion five), Jane has undertaken medical procedures to change her
hormonal sex from male to female. Jane has been taking female
hormones for two years, and as a result, she no longer can function
sexually as a male. Jane also now has the secondary sex characteristics to
satisfy the phenotypic sex criterion (criterion six). She has developed
breast tissue and a more feminine body shape, and she has undertaken
multiple laser surgeries to remove hair on her face and chest. Finally,
Jane satisfies the personal sexual identity criterion (criterion seven)
because she has personally experienced her gender as female since
childhood.
A court, especially one charged with defending a constitution such
as Alaska’s, could find that these three factors are entitled to
considerable weight and, in combination, are more relevant to the
petitioner’s gender than the absence of genital sexual reassignment
surgery. As this Article will show, the Alaska Constitution includes
heightened protections for liberty, privacy, and equal treatment under
the law, all of which appear to be at odds with a requirement of any
form of SRS that is more punitive than functional. Indeed, Alaska’s
tradition of preventing governmental interference with individuals’
“personal autonomy to control . . . appearance or to direct the course of
[people’s] lives,”44 may suggest that Alaska courts applying the Heilig
factors should weigh factors five through seven more heavily by
grouping factors one through three together as a single consideration
when petitioners put forth legitimate reasons for avoiding sexual
reassignment surgery.
D.

SRS Requirements May Violate Public Policy

Although the trend in the United States is for states to require
sexual reassignment surgery before granting gender change
44. Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88, 94 (Alaska 2001).
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amendments to official documents, there is broad support for granting a
change of gender petition when the petitioner has not undergone SRS.45
Put another way, there are several additional reasons why Heilig factors
five through seven should weigh more significantly than factors one
through three. The first three factors (internal morphologic sex, external
morphologic sex, and gonadal sex) all require surgery for transgender
persons, and some scholars assert that it may be bad policy to encourage
sexual reassignment surgery.46 These surgeries are expensive, not very
successful at replicating functional genitalia for FTMs, and, like any
invasive surgery, carry physical risks.47
Requiring surgical procedures to obtain a gender amendment
raises numerous accessibility issues. The cost of surgery and its general
exclusion from insurance coverage48 precludes numerous transgender
individuals from obtaining reassignment,49 implicating a potential class
bias in rules mandating surgical reassignment. The reality that sexchange operations differ in both their invasiveness and ultimate success
for transgender men and transgender women suggests that such a
requirement may be interpreted as a form of sexual discrimination.50
45. See generally Tobin, supra note 27.
46. See id. at 424–29 (“A legal rule with only a very weak basis in public
policy, or even a wholly irrational one, may go unchallenged if its harmful
effects are few and slight. The surgical requirement for gender recognition is far
from harmless. . . . [T]his rule results in unequal treatment and real harm to trans
individuals’ lives and human rights.”); see also Alice Newlin, Should a Trip from
Illinois to Tennessee Change a Woman into a Man?: Proposal for a Uniform Interstate
Sex Reassignment Recognition Act, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 461, 490–92 (2008).
47. See Tobin, supra note 27, at 401 (“Some find the results of available
surgical techniques unsatisfactory in light of the high cost, painful recovery, and
risks of complications and diminished sensation. Transsexual men in particular,
owing to the less advanced state of female-to-male SRS, undergo it much less
frequently than trans women.”); see also Wenstrom, supra note 4, at 140 (“Many
choose not to have surgery due to the risks of complications, the painful and
extended recovery period, and the reduction of erotic sensation.”).
48. See Wenstrom, supra note 4, at 140 (“These surgeries may be
prohibitively expensive, some cost over $70,000 and very few medical insurance
providers cover such surgeries in their plans.”); see also Tobin, supra note 27, at
400 (“While coverage by public or private health insurance is increasingly the
norm in Europe . . . in other countries, such as the United States, private insurers
almost universally deny coverage for SRS.”).
49. See Tobin, supra note 27, at 400 (“Others simply cannot afford these
surgeries, which cost in the tens of thousands of dollars.”).
50. “Surgeries for trans men do not result in a penis ‘with the full capacity to
function sexually as a male’ in the sense of erection, penetration and ejaculation.
New Zealand’s Family Court cited this differential as one reason for favoring an
appearance test over a sexual function test. The appearance test seems to have
the advantage of not operating as a blanket exclusion of trans men.
Nevertheless, it too may disproportionately exclude trans men, because current
surgical techniques produce a much greater cosmetic approximation of typical
genitals for trans women than for trans men. Because it ‘is more advantageous

KINGERY DUBOIS_FMT3.DOC

2009

12/3/2009 11:55:26 AM

TRANSGENDERED IN ALASKA

251

Additionally, disabilities, as well as certain medical conditions and
personal preferences, may preclude the option of surgery for some
transgender people.51 These realities have led some scholars and courts
to find the requirement of sexual reassignment surgery objectionable:
It is curious, therefore, that the Court appeared to fasten on SRS
as the threshold of states’ obligation to recognize that freedom.
Surgical requirements make the enjoyment of this “basic” right
impossible for individuals with certain medical conditions, as
well as those who cannot afford these expensive procedures.
For others, gender recognition will remain out of reach for
years before SRS can be obtained. The then-Chief Justice of the
Family Court of Australia has thus criticized the surgical
requirement (albeit in dicta) as “a cruel and unnecessary
restriction upon a person’s right to [gender recognition, with]
little justification on grounds of principle.”52
Finally, viewing gender self-determination as a right, setting SRS as
a prerequisite for gender change conflicts with the right to bodily
integrity:
Bodily integrity is universally recognized as a fundamental
human right, protected by national laws and constitutions as
well as international conventions. It is well established that a
state violates that right by forcing individuals to undergo
invasive medical procedures. The state, however, should not
force an individual to forgo one basic right to enjoy another.
This is precisely what states do whenever they make surgery a
prerequisite for gender recognition.53

and burdensome for people seeking legal recognition of their transition from
female to male rather than male to female,’ Australia’s Family Court has
suggested in dicta that surgery requirements may operate as ‘a form of indirect
[sex] discrimination.’” Id. at 424–25.
51. “Certain medical reasons such as age, weight, preexisting medical
conditions, or HIV status may make some treatments unavailable. . . . In
addition, there are many personal reasons that someone may not undergo
surgery such as not being able to take time off work, not having support people
who would be available to help them through the recovery period, or having a
fear of doctors, hospitals, and/or surgery.” Wenstrom, supra note 4, at 140; see
also id. at 141 (“A recent study found that only three percent of [female to male
transsexuals] pursue genital surgery due to the costs, limitations of the
procedure, as well as the medical risks associated with it. This means that only
three percent of the trans male population would be eligible for an amended
birth certificate.”).
52. Tobin, supra note 27, at 426 (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 427 (citation omitted).
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The conflict between equality and rights to both bodily integrity
and gender self-determination, on the one hand, and SRS requirements
on the other, indicates that such requirements are detrimental to both
the individual transgender person and society as a whole.

III. MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS
A.

The Current Political Climate in Alaska

Anchorage has seen its own political debate surrounding, in part,
the civil rights of transgender individuals. In May 2009, Acting Mayor
Matt Claman proposed an amendment to the City’s current antidiscrimination ordinance, at the request of a citizens’ group known as
Equality Works. The amendment would have added sexual orientation
to the list of characteristics (already including, among others, race, sex,
religion, marital status, and age) protected from discrimination in
employment, education, property sales and rentals, public
accommodations, and City practices.
This was the third time in over thirty years that a proposition to
ban discrimination based on sexual orientation had been up for public
hearing. More than five hundred people signed up to testify before the
city council, making the debate “[t]he longest, bitterest argument in
Anchorage’s social and political experience.”54
Several drafts of the amendment were presented in an effort to
obtain a consensus. A central point of the dispute was whether the
amendment would protect transgender individuals. The first version of
the amendment provided that the term “sexual orientation” applied to
transgender individuals.55 This inclusion proved controversial,56 leading
54. Don Hunter, Gay Rights Go Before Assembly Once Again, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, June 7, 2009, at A1. Interestingly, immediately before this round of
the Anchorage anti-discrimination ordinance debate, Fairbanks saw its own
debate over the rights of transgender children in the public school system. See
Joel Davidson, Alaska School District Adds ‘Gender Identity’ to Official Policy,
CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 11, 2009, available at http://www.
catholicnewsagency.com/new.php?n=15340.
55. Id. at A6–A7. (“Sexual orientation means actual or perceived
heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality or gender expression or identity. As
used in this definition, ‘gender expression or identity’ means having or being
perceived as having a self-image, appearance, or behavior different from that
traditionally associated with the sex assigned to that person at birth.”).
56. Pastor Prevo announced, “[t]his ordinance actually [empowers]
transvestites, cross-dressers. It goes to provide protection for what I believe is
really that aspect of the homosexual movement that probably even the normal
homosexuals are not proud of.” Don Hunter, Measure Empowers Those Whose
Behavior Is Extreme, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 7, 2009, at A7. “Prevo said he
would ‘possibly’ consider supporting an amendment if the word ‘sexual
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the drafters to drop the explicit protection for transgender individuals.
The Anchorage Daily News reported on the issue, stating:
Just as the issue did when it arose decades ago, it is bitterly
dividing the city but has also brought them together for the
discussion before the Assembly. In line together in the middle
of the Assembly chambers, waiting for their turns to speak,
were transgender people standing beside those who likened
them to pedophiles and miscreants.57
In August 2009, a version of the amendment was passed by the
Assembly by a seven to four vote, but then was vetoed by the recentlyelected mayor, Dan Sullivan.58 Ultimately, the amendment failed, as the
Assembly did not gather the eight votes needed to override the mayor’s
veto.59
B.

The Role of the Court

Anchorage’s debate over the proposed anti-discrimination
ordinance makes clear the political fervor surrounding the rights and
protections afforded to the transgender community. The public
controversy, however, simply highlights the need for courts to be
removed from the will of the majority. Historically, the democratic
process has often failed to protect minority rights.60 Thus, it has always
been the responsibility of the courts to defend the liberty of those
outside of the majority:

orientation’ was removed and in its place was written ‘straight, gay and
lesbians,’ and if iron-clad exemptions were given to not only religious
organizations but also religious people.” Megan Holland, Gay Rights Measure’s
Changes Criticized by Both Sides, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 18, 2009, at A1.
57. Megan Holland, Battle Lines Drawn—Hearing Continues on Sexualorientation Issue that Divides City: Round 2 of the Anti-Discrimination Ordinance
Debate, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 17, 2009, at A1.
58. See Don Hunter, Assembly OKs Gay Rights Ordinance 7-4, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 11, 2009; Don Hunter, Sullivan Vetoes Gay Rights Ordinance,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 17, 2009.
59. See Don Hunter, Assembly Makes No Move To Override Gay Rights Veto,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Aug. 25, 2009.
60. Consider the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. See LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, 668 (2d ed. 1985) (speculating that
the Civil Rights Movement would have failed without the intervention of federal
courts). For a discussion of how direct democracy in particular has failed
minority rights, see Cody Hoesly, Reforming Direct Democracy: Lessons from
Oregon, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1209 (2005) (“When it comes to laws that
discriminate against minorities, initiatives can easily play to popular prejudices.
Thus, while initiatives promoting civil rights for minorities generally fail, those
restricting minority rights often succeed.”).
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[T]he very purpose of limiting the power of the elected
branches of government by constitutional provisions like the
Equal Protection Clause is “to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts.”61
Similarly, although the framers of the Alaskan and Federal
Constitutions probably did not have transgender people in mind when
they drafted the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privacy (Alaska)
Clauses, they likely knew that “times can blind us to certain truths and
later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in
fact serve only to oppress, and as our constitution endures, persons in
every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater
freedom and equality.”62

IV. THE FEDERAL AND ALASKA CONSTITUTIONS
Alaska has no statutory scheme addressing change of gender.
There is no appellate opinion in Alaska that discusses whether such
relief may be granted. The superior courts maintain broad jurisdiction in
equity and do thereby possess the inherent authority to consider such
petitions.63 With guidance from the Alaska and Federal Equal Protection
Clauses, Alaska’s constitutional right to privacy, the Maryland Court of
Appeals’ decision in Heilig,64 and a variety of legal and medical treatises
addressing the topic, some Alaska Superior Courts have held that
petitioners were entitled to an order recognizing a change of gender.

61. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 875 (Iowa 2009) (citing W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
62. Id. at 876 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (acknowledging the intent of the Framers of the
Federal Constitution that the Constitution endure and be interpreted by future
generations)).
63. See Wolff v. Arctic Bowl, Inc., 560 P.2d 758, 770 (Alaska 1977) (“The
exercise of equitable jurisdiction is a matter of discretion for the trial court.”); see
also 27 Am. Jur. 2d, Equity § 1 (2009) (“‘Equity’ has been said to be the name of
the principal or set of principles under which substantial justice may be attained
in particular cases where the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law
seem to be inadequate.”).
64. See generally In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68 (Md. 2003).
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Equal Protection

Both the Federal and Alaska Constitutions prohibit discrimination
based on sexual orientation.65 The Supreme Court stated in the
landmark case of Romer v. Evans that “[a] law declaring that in general it
shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek
aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws
in the most literal sense.”66 Because the Alaska Constitution “mandates
equal treatment of those similarly situated[,] it protects Alaskans’ right
to non-discriminatory treatment more robustly than does the federal
equal protection clause.”67 The Alaska Supreme Court has “long
recognized that [this clause] affords greater protection to individual
rights than the United States Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment.”68
This Article, therefore, will focus on the more broadly protective Equal
Protection Clause in place in Alaska.
Alaska applies a three-step, sliding scale test “that places a
progressively greater or lesser burden on the [S]tate, depending on the
importance of the individual right affected by the disputed classification
and the nature of the governmental interest at stake.”69 The first step is
to identify the group subject to discrimination and determine whether
there is “disparate treatment of similarly situated persons.”70
As a transgender individual, Jane is potentially subject to
discrimination within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Alaska Constitution. Her request for change of gender touches on two
equal protection claims: gender discrimination and discrimination based
on sexual orientation.
If the court decided to deny Jane’s request for a change of gender, it
would effectively be denying her right to live in her true gender,
implicating her right to be free from discrimination based on gender.71

65. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Alaska Civil Liberties
Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781 (Alaska 2005).
66. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
67. State Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, Inc.,
28 P.3d 904, 909 (Alaska 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 122 P.3d at 785 (citing Alaska Const. art. 1, §
1); Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 420 (Alaska 2003).
69. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 122 P.3d at 787 (quoting Malabed, 70 P.3d at
420–21).
70. Id.
71. The assertion that transgender persons face harassment and
discrimination is supported by the brutal fact that the murder rate for
transgender persons is seven to ten times higher than the national average.
Wenstrom, supra note 4, at 135 n.11; see also id. at 136 (noting other kinds of
discrimination transgender individuals often experience when their documented
gender does not match their lived gender, such as being accused of fraud,
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As the Maryland Court of Appeals noted in Heilig, “a person has a deep
personal, social, and economic interest in having the official designation
of his or her gender match what, in fact, it always was or possibly has
become.”72 Jane’s right to be free from discrimination based on sex, as
established by the Alaska Constitution, would be offended if her
petition was denied, because such denial discriminates against
individuals who are unable to conform to social expectations attached to
their lived gender.73 The discrimination can likewise be classified as
sexual orientation discrimination because disallowing or strictly limiting
access to gender change is “so closely correlated with being homosexual
as to make it apparent that such a prohibition targets gay and lesbian
people as a class.”74
Having identified Jane’s petition as falling under the auspices of
Alaska’s Equal Protection Clause, the next step is to examine whether
the disparate treatment is allowed under a three-step, sliding scale
analysis.75
First, it must be determined at the outset what weight should
be afforded the constitutional interest impaired by the
challenged enactment. The nature of this interest is the most
important variable in fixing the appropriate level of review. . . .
Depending upon the primacy of the interest involved, the state
will have a greater or lesser burden in justifying its legislation.
Second, an examination must be undertaken of the purposes
served by a challenged statute. Depending on the level of

denied services, humiliated, or even attacked). Denying Jane her requested legal
gender change would serve to further expose her to this discrimination because
legal documents that display a gender designation at odds with a person’s lived
gender open the door to targeted harassment. Id. at 135 (“Transgender people
living outside their birth assigned gender are vulnerable to harassment,
violence, and discrimination when their gender identity is revealed. A common
way in which their status is revealed is through incongruent identity
documents.”).
72. In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 79 (Md. 2003).
73. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3 (“No person is to be denied the enjoyment of
any civil or political right because of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin.
The legislature shall implement this section.”).
74. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 2009) (citing Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Iowa
Supreme Court recently held that restricting marriage to couples composed of
one man and one woman targeted and discriminated against the GLBT
community. Similarly, by placing the opportunity to present to the world legally
as one’s lived gender outside the realistic reach of transgendered men and
women, a prohibition or strict limitation on gender amendments will
differentiate “implicitly on the basis of sexual orientation.” Id.
75. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781, 787–89 (Alaska
2005).
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review determined, the state may be required to show only that
its objectives were legitimate, at the low end of the continuum,
or, at the high end of the scale, that the legislation was
motivated by a compelling state interest. Third, an evaluation
of the state’s interest in the particular means employed to
further its goals must be undertaken. Once again, the state’s
burden will differ in accordance with the determination of the
level of scrutiny under the first state of analysis. At the low end
of the sliding scale, we have held that a substantial relationship
between means and ends is constitutionally adequate. At the
higher end of the scale, the fit between means and ends must
be much closer. If the purpose can be accomplished by a less
restrictive alternative, the classification will be invalidated.76
Agencies seeking to prevent change of gender petitions will likely
use the arguments of cost control and efficiency to attempt to overcome
the assertions in favor of granting change of gender under the Equal
Protection Clause. In Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, the Alaska
Supreme Court examined whether the municipality’s denial of same-sex
partner benefits violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court held
that while “[t]he governmental interests of cost control, administrative
efficiency, and promotion of marriage are legitimate . . . the absolute
denial of benefits to public employees with same-sex domestic partners
is not substantially related to these governmental interests.”77
Petitions for change of gender have practical complications. Just as
the courts consider administrative and practical consequences in cases
concerning same-sex marriage, Alaska courts will need to weigh the
practical realities and complications that granting change of gender
petitions entails. In Alaska Civil Liberties Union, the court considered
whether same-sex couples were constitutionally entitled to benefits
programs previously only available to married couples.78 In making this
determination, the Alaska Supreme Court weighed the three asserted
governmental interests of “cost control, administrative efficiency, and
promotion of marriage—in limiting benefits to spouses and dependent
children.”79 These same interests arise in the context of change of gender
petitions. Additionally, courts will need to consider the specific
administrative concerns presented by change of gender. For example,
issues will likely arise regarding how to treat and house prisoners who
have a change of gender, how to address the additional administrative

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 789 (citation omitted).
Id. at 793–94.
Id. at 783.
Id. at 790.
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costs related to change of gender petitions, and how those petitions will
affect the state’s Marriage Amendment.80
In a recent decision, Varnum v. Brien,81 the Iowa Supreme Court
called one’s sexual orientation “central to personal identity.”82 Similarly,
one’s gender is central to one’s identity. The state would have to
demonstrate a particular compelling governmental interest to overcome
one’s right to live in his or her true gender. Looking at the Iowa Court’s
decision in Varnum, it is unlikely any government interest could be
compelling enough to overcome the burden required under Alaska’s
Equal Protection Clause. Notably, living in one’s true gender does not
require SRS. As a result, a state’s interest in supporting societal gender
expectations does not require SRS. Jane’s interest in living according to
her self-identification as a woman, rather than living according to her
assigned gender, must be given great weight because gender implicates
so many aspects of her day-to-day life. While there may be legitimate
governmental interests in efficiently utilizing court resources and
administrative efficiency in processing change of gender claims, as well
as in limiting changes to birth certificates and other governmental forms
of identification, these interests are not sufficiently compelling to
overcome a person’s essential and fundamental right to live as the
gender that he or she clearly perceives is correct for him or her.
Ultimately, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that the
government’s asserted interests in Alaska Civil Liberties Union did not
outweigh the rights of same-sex couples under an equal protection
analysis.83 When considering change of gender legal arguments,
continued evaluation of the legal and practical realities of allowing
people to change their gender is warranted. As noted above, granting
petitions to change gender has the potential to affect regulation of
marriage (if, for example, a transsexual who changed their gender elects
to marry a person who lives in the gender the transsexual changed
from); Department of Corrections housing (for example, housing a
transsexual whose birth certificate identifies them as one gender while
they retain the genitalia of the opposite gender); cost control (in the form
of increased requests for amending documents with governmental
departments); and administrative efficiency (both in the court system
and in the departments that make and effectuate the amendments to
documents).

80.
81.
82.
83.

ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25.
763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
Id. at 907.
Id. at 893–94.
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Based on case precedent and the emerging trends in the law, it is
unlikely that the government would be able to assert an interest
outweighing the rights of transgender persons. In Varnum, the Iowa
Supreme Court applied the equal protection test to its marriage
amendment and held that the state law prohibiting gay marriage was
unconstitutional, stating that “the language in Iowa Code section 595.2
limiting civil marriage to a man and a woman must be stricken from the
statute, and the remaining statutory language must be interpreted and
applied in a manner allowing gay and lesbian people full access to the
institution of civil marriage.”84 It further stated that:
[B]ecause sexual orientation is central to personal identity and
may be altered [if at all] only at the expense of significant
damage to the individual’s sense of self, classifications based
on sexual orientation are no less entitled to consideration as a
suspect or quasi-suspect class than any other group that has
been deemed to exhibit an immutable characteristic.85
Furthermore, “[b]ecause sexual orientation is such an essential
component of personhood, even if there is some possibility that a
person’s sexual preference can be altered, it would be wholly
unacceptable for the state to require anyone to do so.”86 The court
specifically held that distinguishing between same-sex marriage and
heterosexual marriage “would be equally suspect and difficult to square
with the fundamental principles of equal protection embodied in our
constitution.”87 The court specifically noted a person’s sexual orientation
is “an essential component of personhood.”88 Similarly, a person’s
gender is their “psychosexual individuality or identity.”89 The rights of
personal identity identified in Varnum support the assertion that gender
is also protected under the Equal Protection Clause. Further, this
language arguably supports granting change of gender petitions based
on equal protection rights.
Similarly, in 1999, the State Supreme Court of Vermont, in Baker v.
State,90 overturned a law that prevented same-sex couples from enjoying
the benefits and protections of marriage.91 Using an equal protection
analysis, the court held that “plaintiffs may not be deprived of the
84. Id. at 907.
85. Id. at 893 (quoting Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 438–
39 (Conn. 2008)).
86. Id. at 895 (quoting Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 432).
87. Id. at 906.
88. Id. at 895.
89. In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 72 n.4 (Md. 2003).
90. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
91. Id. at 867.
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statutory benefits and protections afforded persons of the opposite sex
who choose to marry. We hold that the State is constitutionally required
to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and protections that
flow from marriage under Vermont law.”92 The Vermont Supreme Court
did not go so far as to mandate that the state accept gay marriage.
Instead, it left the legislature to determine whether and how it would
regulate the availability of civil unions. Both the Varnum and Baker
courts found that the Equal Protection Clause protects the rights of
same-sex couples regarding marriage. The courts underscored that equal
protection prevents states from treating homosexual and heterosexual
couples differently when it comes to marriage. Similarly, it is arguable
that the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal Constitution and the
Alaska Constitution prevent Alaska courts from treating transsexuals
differently than heterosexuals when it comes to living in one’s true
gender. Further, the cases demonstrate how courts continue to expand
the scope of protection for members of the GLBT community.
B.

Due Process and Privacy

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution also provides valuable guidance on the issue
of granting a change of gender petition. The most instructive federal
case on this issue is Lawrence v. Texas.93 In Lawrence, the Court
considered the petition of two homosexual men who were criminally
prosecuted under Texas sodomy laws.94 The Court characterized the
issue as “[w]hether petitioners’ criminal convictions for adult
consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in
liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”95 The Court also acknowledged that “adults
may choose to enter upon [relationships] in the confines of their homes
and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free
persons.”96
The Court further stated that this “liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex.”97 This is no less true for Jane. Her
choice of how to express her gender and associated sexuality is within
the realm of protection envisioned by the Lawrence Court.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Id. at 563.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 572.
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In its holding, the Lawrence Court specifically addressed the right to
privacy and the link between liberty and the Due Process Clause,
stating:
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to
liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right
to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government. It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a
realm of personal liberty which the government may not
enter.98
The Court ultimately held that the Texas statute did not further a
legitimate state interest that could “justify its intrusion into the personal
and private life of the individual.”99
One could argue, however, that Lawrence cannot be construed to
suggest that there is a constitutional duty to require a facile procedure
for gender amendments to official identification documents. In Lawrence,
for example, the activity regulated, a sexual act, was unambiguously
within the realm of private life. Transgender petitioners, on the other
hand, seek to perform a more public act: changing the gender which
appears on their official documents. However, the constitutional rights
implicit in this debate are not necessarily limited to the constraints of
Lawrence, because the privacy protections afforded in that case are
magnified by the specific right to privacy in the Alaska Constitution,
which grants that “[t]he right of the people to privacy is recognized and
shall not be infringed.”100 The state supreme court has interpreted the
Privacy Clause as follows: “Because this right to privacy is explicit, its
protections are necessarily more robust and broader in scope than those
of the implied federal right to privacy.”101
98. Id. at 578 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
847 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. Id. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has also upheld
gender self-determination. Tobin, supra note 27, at 425 (“[T]he ECHR’s gender
recognition jurisprudence has emphasized the individual’s ‘freedom to define
herself [or himself] as a female [or male] person.’ The Court identifies this
freedom as an aspect of the right to private life under the European Convention,
and characterizes it as ‘one of the most basic essentials of self-determination.’”).
100. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
101. State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 171 P.3d 577, 581 (Alaska 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 514–15
(Alaska 1975)) (Boochever, J., concurring) (reasoning that “[s]ince the citizens of
Alaska . . . enacted an amendment to the Alaska Constitution expressly
providing for a right to privacy not found in the United States Constitution, it
can only be concluded that that right is broader in scope than that of the Federal
Constitution.”).

KINGERY DUBOIS_FMT3.DOC

262

12/3/2009 11:55:26 AM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 26:2

Liberty102 and privacy103 in the Alaska Constitution have often been
analyzed together when addressing questions of personal autonomy.104
Before the right to privacy was added to the constitution by voter
initiative in 1972,105 the Alaska Supreme Court, in Breese v. Smith,106 held
that a student’s right to liberty included the right to express himself by
wearing long hair. 107 The Breese court stated:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint
or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law. . . . The United States of America, and Alaska
in particular, reflect a pluralistic society, grounded upon such
basic values as the preservation of maximum individual choice,
protection of minority sentiments, and appreciation for
divergent lifestyles. The spectre of governmental control of the
physical appearances of private citizens, young and old, is
antithetical to a free society, contrary to our notions of a
government of limited powers, and repugnant to the concept of
personal liberty. It has been observed that [there] are few
things more personal than one’s body and its appearance, and
there could be few laws more destructive of the notion that
there is a range of decision making within which the individual
is autonomous than a rule regulating physical makeup.108
The individual autonomy at issue in Breese also applies to the rights
involved in change of gender: just as the student in Breese had “the right
‘to be let alone,’”109 so, too, does Jane. If “[n]o right is held more sacred .
. . than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person,”110 Jane has the inalienable right to possess and control her
person. Further, Jane’s request to have her legal documents reflect her
lived gender is a “personal aspect” of her life “which [has] no direct
102. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1.
103. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
104. See, e.g., Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88, 90 (Alaska 2001); Ravin v.
State, 537 P.2d 494, 500 (Alaska 1975) (“In Alaska this court has dealt with the
concept of privacy on only a few occasions. One of the most significant decisions
in this area is Breese v. Smith, where we considered the applicability of the
guarantee of ‘life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness’ found in the Alaska
Constitution, to a school hairlength [sic] regulation.”)
105. Erwin Chemerinsky, Privacy and the Alaska Constitution: Failing to Fulfill
the Promise, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 29, 30 (2003).
106. 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972).
107. Id. at 168.
108. Id. at 168–69 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
109. Id. at 171.
110. Id.
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bearing on the ability of others to enjoy their liberty.”111 As such, her
request appears to be clearly within the scope of liberty defined by the
Breese court, making a strong argument that her requested gender
designation is a fundamental and protected right in Alaska. Moreover,
to deny Jane her right to specify her gender would be to take a position
antithetical to the Breese court’s recognition that our country as a whole,
and Alaska in particular, is a “grounded upon such basic values as the
preservation of maximum individual choice, protection of minority
sentiments, and appreciation for divergent lifestyles.”112 Jane’s decision
to live as a woman certainly reflects a minority sentiment and a lifestyle
divergent from the mainstream. To interfere with her decision by
denying her the right to present herself to the world as a woman,
however, would be to erode Alaska’s “basic value” of “maximum
individual choice.”113
Any state-required procedure that infringes the right of the
individual “to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law,”114 must therefore fall short of the Breese precedent. At
least in Alaska, the law surrounding gender change petitions is not
“clear and unquestionable.”115 A surgery with such substantial
drawbacks as SRS, when required in order to have legal documents that
match one’s lived identity, can be seen as constituting “interference of
others,” just as it is a “restraint,” on “those personal aspects of our lives
which have no direct bearing on the ability of others to enjoy their
liberty.”116 Thus, a requirement of genital reconstruction SRS117 for legal
gender change appears to be at odds with the protections of the Alaska
Constitution.
The case law interpreting Alaska’s specific constitutional right to
privacy also supports change of gender actions by courts. Sampson v.
State118 held that neither the right to privacy nor the right to liberty
include a right to assisted suicide.119 In coming to its conclusion, the

111. Id. at 168 (quoting Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284–85 (1st Cir.
1970)).
112. Id. at 169.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 168.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Most, but not all, of the surgeries considered to be SRS involve genital
reconstruction. The analysis for chest reconstruction surgery, which is also
sometimes considered SRS, would be different because the drawbacks to those
surgeries are not as severe.
118. 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001).
119. Id. at 95.
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court summarized the case law interpreting the privacy clause and
reasoned as follows:
Valley Hospital [Ass’n v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice]120, Breese,
Ravin [v. State]121, and McCracken [v. State]122 collectively set the
framework for recognizing fundamental rights of personal
autonomy implicit in our constitution. These cases establish
that the history and tradition of a right in Alaska are important
because they help to determine whether the right falls within
the intention and spirit of our constitution. Moreover, history
and tradition tend to define our society’s expectations of what
rights are necessary for civilized life and ordered liberty. All of
these cases address situations involving personal autonomy to
control our appearance or to direct the course of our lives; none
even remotely hints at any historical or legal support for the
proposition that the general right of personal autonomy
incorporates a right to physician-assisted suicide.123
Although the Sampson decision limited the holding of Breese, the
court made clear that what was at stake in Sampson was fundamentally
different from what was at stake in the previous cases that interpreted
the right to privacy and personal liberty.124 The court thus created a
narrow exception to the traditional interpretation of the constitutional
protections afforded to issues of personal autonomy regarding control of
one’s appearance and life direction.
Jane’s situation does not fall within the narrow exception of
Sampson. Unlike the petitioners in Sampson, Jane is not seeking an
exception to a bedrock criminal principle under the authority of the
Privacy Clause. Also, unlike the asserted right to assisted suicide at issue
in Sampson, the right to have one’s legal gender follow one’s lived
gender is an issue directly “involving personal autonomy to control our
appearance or to direct the course of our lives.”125
An aspect of appearance is how one holds oneself out to the world.
Jane is asking that she be allowed to present herself to the world, via her
legal gender designation, in a manner congruent with her lived identity.
Moreover, her desire to live in full conformity with the social concepts
associated with being a woman is clearly a matter involving her ability
to direct the course of her life. Finally, it is also a matter that affects

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997).
537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
518 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1974).
Sampson, 31 P.3d at 94.
Id.
Id.
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control over her own body, which the Alaska Supreme Court recently
held to be a “fundamental autonomy.”126
Thus, the limited holding of Sampson should not preclude
application of the Breese precedent to the question of what legal standard
should be used to determine whether a petition for change of gender
ought to be granted.127 As stated in Sampson, Alaska has a long legal
history and tradition of protecting people’s right to control their
appearance and life direction.128 The holdings in Sampson and Breese
suggest that the constitutional protections of liberty and privacy grant
Alaskan citizens the right to match their legal gender designation to
their lived gender without the imposition of any overly burdensome
preconditions, such as genital sexual reassignment surgery.
C.

Due Process: Liberty and the Right to Employment

Jane testified that she has experienced difficulty obtaining and
maintaining employment because her state identification lists her as
male, yet she presents to the general public as female.129 There is
evidence that suggests Jane’s troubles are not unique. A recent law
review article noted that, due to the discrimination faced by transgender
people, refusing amendment of gender designations on birth certificates
126. State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 171 P.3d 577, 582 n.28 (Alaska
2007) (“The dissent appears to liken a minor’s decision of whether to terminate a
pregnancy to decisions about attending school field trips, joining sports teams,
viewing ‘R’-rated movies, and lifting weights at the gym. But this analogy
overlooks the fundamental autonomy at stake in an adolescent’s control over her
own body.”).
127. Indeed, Sampson refers to much of the relevant Breese language when
explaining the Breese holding, which it did not reject: “We also stated that the
rights to control personal appearance implicated the important Alaska values of
the ‘preservation of maximum individual choice, protection of minority
sentiments, and appreciation for divergent lifestyles,’ as well as ‘notions of a
government of limited powers.’ . . . We also recounted the importance of
individual autonomy in Alaskan history.” Sampson, 31 P.3d at 93–94 (citing
Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 169 (Alaska 1972)).
128. Id. at 94.
129. Driver’s licenses with gender markers that match a person’s lived
identity are essential to obtaining employment. Although in most places it is
easier to obtain a reassigned gender on a driver’s license than a birth certificate,
and generally proof of medical or surgical procedures are not required, there are
still barriers that prevent many transgender individuals from obtaining
congruent identification, and thus prevent them from obtaining employment. See
Bergstedt, supra note 3, at 680–81. Bergstedt also notes that while all fifty states
and the District of Columbia have some avenue for changing a person’s gender
on his or her license, some states have a much more daunting process than
others. Id. at 681 n.30. From Bergstedt’s personal research, the states with the
most restrictive policies are Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, and Tennessee. Id.
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prevents “transgender people from acquiring congruent identity
documents that are necessary for obtaining employment, benefits, and
services.”130 The article further notes that “[transgender] people are
routinely fired when their gender identity is discovered by their
employer.”131
Although the availability of employment is not a fundamental right
in Alaska sufficient to require strict scrutiny under the United States
Constitution,132 it is still considered an “important right.”133 It is
protected under Article I, Section I of the Alaska Constitution, and the
Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution.134 Without income
from employment, Jane is financially unable to undergo sexual
reassignment surgery. If courts were to require surgery as a prerequisite
to gender amendment, Jane would be in a catch-22, where she could not
obtain employment because her identity documents would expose her
to discrimination, but could not amend her identity documents to
overcome the discrimination and acquire employment because she
would lack the requisite financial means to do so.
Protection of citizens’ right to employment requires courts to
permit state actions135 interfering with personal employment only when

130. Wenstrom, supra note 4, at 132 (citing Letter from Dean Spade, Founder,
Sylvia Rivera Legal Resource Program, et al. to Isaac Weisfuse, City of New York
Dept. of Health (Nov. 18, 2002), available at http://srlp.org/node/93).
131. Id. at 133 n.7 (citing Dean Spade, Compliance is Gendered: Struggling for
Gender Self-Determination in a Hostile Economy, TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 217, 219
(2006)); see also Bergstedt, supra note 3, at 681 (“If a person does not have
identification that accurately reflects his or her social gender, that person is put
in a position of potential danger on a daily basis and may be forced to live on
society’s margins because of an inability to obtain gainful employment, credit, or
bank accounts.”).
132. Matson v. Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n, 785 P.2d 1200,
1204 (Alaska 1990).
133. Id. at 1205.
134. The Alaska Constitution declares that “all persons have a natural right to
life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the enjoyment of the rewards of their
own industry . . . .” ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1. The United States Constitution
contains a parallel provision. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The U.S. Constitution also
protects citizens against state deprivations of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, and it grants citizens the right to equal protection of the
laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
135. “State Action” is defined as “[a]nything done by a government; esp., in
constitutional law, an intrusion on a person’s rights (esp. civil rights) either by a
governmental entity or by a private requirement that can be enforced only by
governmental action (such as a racially restrictive covenant, which requires
judicial action for enforcement).” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1444 (8th ed. 2004).
One could argue that a requirement of SRS for gender amendment to legal
documents, be it by statute, judicial precedent, or Bureau of Vital Statistics
policy, is a state action that interferes with personal employment.
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the interference is “closely related to an important state interest,”136 and
courts may be hard-pressed to find a state interest that closely relates to
a policy requiring sexual reassignment surgery prior to a legal gender
amendment.

V. PRACTICAL REALITIES
A.

Transsexuals and Marriage

The issues surrounding change of gender and transexualism bleed
into the issues surrounding gay marriage. Those who oppose same-sex
marriage may view legal gender change as an attempt to circumvent the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)137 and the state laws and
constitutional amendments that have sought to preserve a traditional
notion of marriage.138
DOMA holds that no state will be required to give full faith and
credit to any same-sex marriage granted by another state. The Full Faith
and Credit Clause, on the other hand, allows people to have some
certainty as to their legal status and responsibilities.139 The country has
136. Matson, 785 P.2d at 1205 (citing State v. Enserch Alaska Constr., Inc., 787
P.2d 624, 632 (Alaska, 1989)).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
138. See Christine Vestal, Gay Marriage Legal in Six States, STATELINE.ORG (Apr.
8, 2009), available at http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=
347390 (indicating the thirty states that have constitutional amendments
prohibiting same-sex marriage and the thirty-six states that have statutes
prohibiting same-sex marriage).
139. The Full Faith and Credit Clause reads as follows: “Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings
of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. DOMA, on the other hand, states, “No
State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other
State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship.” 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. Thus, DOMA carves out an exception to the
expansive rule of full faith and credit. Some have suggested that DOMA is
unconstitutional because it violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and at least
one court has addressed the issue, holding that DOMA was valid. Wilson v.
Ake, 354 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“Adopting Plaintiffs’ rigid and
literal interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause would create a license
for a single State to create national policy.”). For a discussion of the intersection
of DOMA, full faith and credit, and transgender jurisprudence, see Mark
Strasser, Marriage, Transsexuals, and the Meaning of Sex: On DOMA, Full Faith and
Credit, and Statutory Interpretation, 3 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 301 (2003). See
also Newlin, supra note 46 (“Even when a state does provide a mechanism for
changing one’s legal sex, the state’s chosen procedure may not be entitled to full
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faced this issue before, during the period when some states began
allowing divorces and others did not.140 Problems would clearly arise if,
for instance, Bill was married to Susan in Kansas, divorced her and
married Fran in Ohio, and was considered married to Susan in one state,
to Fran in another, and to no one at all in a third.
Despite mixed public opinion, the Full Faith and Credit Clause was
eventually interpreted to require states to respect the findings of divorce
made by sister states.141 There was political uproar at the time, not
unlike the current moment’s political storm surrounding same-sex
marriage. Unless DOMA is rescinded, however, as more states allow
gay marriage, history is preparing to repeat itself and the country will
see a great deal of confusion surrounding peoples’ legal status and their
responsibilities and benefits via their relationships to others.
Gender change adds another wrinkle to the debate on gay
marriage. Marriage has been held repeatedly to be a fundamental right
in the United States.142 Even prisoners have been afforded constitutional
protection when their right to marriage has been abridged by jailors.143 It
is unclear, however, who, if anyone, a transsexual is allowed to marry.
Presumably, when one has changed from a woman to a man in a state
with no same-sex marriage, his pool of eligible spouses has flipped.
That, however, has not been the case in this budding area of
jurisprudence. The Ohio Court of Appeals in In re Marriage License of
Nash144 affirmed the denial of a marriage license for a transsexual who
had undergone SRS and obtained an amended birth certificate and

faith and credit in other states. As the law currently stands, Tennessee will not
recognize a marriage contracted in Illinois between a man and a transgender
woman, because Tennessee considers this a same-sex marriage.”).
140. For a history of U.S. divorce policy and its intersection with the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, see Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the
Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 396–406 (2007).
141. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303–04 (1942); see also
JUDICIARY: Divorce Wins a Verdict, TIME, Jan. 4, 1943, available at http://
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,790647,00.html (noting that the
Supreme Court had recently overruled the thirty-seven-year-old precedent
exempting divorce decrees from full faith and credit, thereby requiring all states
to recognize divorces granted by other states).
142. See Allen E. Shoenberger, Alternative Visions of the Family: The European
Constitutional Perception of Family Law: Comparison with American Jurisprudence, 18
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 419, 440 n.167 (2009) (citing Maynard v. Hill,
125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 388 (1978)).
143. Schoenberger, supra note 142, at 440 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
91 (1987)).
144. Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec.
31, 2003).
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driver’s license.145 Under this outcome, Mr. Nash is not allowed to marry
anyone. He is legally a man, and his state has since banned same-sex
marriage,146 so he cannot marry another man; yet the court refuses to
grant him a marriage license with a woman. Because marriage is a
fundamental right, this situation presents clear constitutional problems.
Beyond the considerable due process complications, full faith and
credit is also likely to be implicated as transgender rights grow. Perhaps
as states take differing positions on the requirements for legal gender
change (and marriage availability), Congress will enact another
exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, further contributing to the
oncoming storm of status confusion.
Looking abroad, the courts may find guidance from Europe. Not
only does the European Court of Human Rights require its member
countries to permit change of gender designations for transgender
individuals who undergo sex change operations,147 it has gone a step
further in requiring its countries to allow marriages between a
transgender individual and a person of his or her original gender.148 This
protects the right to marry and keeps people’s marital status relatively
clear.
B.

On the Horizon: REAL ID

The REAL ID Act of 2005 may make the legal change of gender
process even more arduous.149 Though the final version of the law leaves
145. Id. at *1; see also Schoenberger, supra note 142, at 440 (“The major
exception [to the lack of American judicial opinions regarding transgender
marriage] is In re Marriage License of Nash, in which an Ohio court affirmed the
denial of a marriage license, holding that such a marriage was against public
policy, despite the fact that a number of other American courts have considered
the validity of such marriages for other purposes such as inheritance, support
payments, and standing to litigate medical malpractice cases.”).
146. OHIO CONST., ART. XV, § 11 (effective Dec. 2, 2004).
147. See I v. United Kingdom, (2003) 36 E.H.R.R. 53, P 73; see also
Shoenberger, supra note 142, at 435–38 for a discussion of ECHR cases dealing
with transgender issues.
148. Schoenberger, supra note 142, at 440 (“The ECHR held in Goodwin v.
United Kingdom that the United Kingdom’s failure to recognize a marriage
between a person who had undergone a sex change operation and a person of
his/her original gender violated Article 8 of the Convention.”) (citing Goodwin
v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18). After the Goodwin decision, the UK
adopted the Gender Recognition Act (GRA) (2004), which sets the standard for
what petitioners must show to change their gender designation. See Tobin, supra
note 27, at 429–34 (discusses the GRA and its rejection of an SRS requirement).
149. PUB. L. NO. 109-13, § 202(b), 119 Stat. 231, 311 (2005). The act imposes
federal security and authentication standards, set by the Department of
Homeland Security, on driver’s licenses and identification cards. Without an ID
that meets those federal standards, people will be denied access to federal
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the issue of gender change to the states,150 the Department of Homeland
Security will require states to adhere to standardized procedures for
submitting name and gender changes. In his article Estate Planning and
the Transgendered Client, Bergstedt hypothesizes that through the
implementation of REAL ID, “common law name changes will likely
become obsolete.”151 Similarly, this Act could affect the way in which
states process change of gender petitions as well. Most significantly,
immigrants who are required to use passports in order to apply for
documents covered under REAL ID will most certainly have their
incongruent gender documents exposed to scrutiny.152

CONCLUSION
Alaska’s courts face the task of addressing change of gender
petitions without the benefit of specific legislative guidelines. As more
petitions are filed, consistent application of the law will become
increasingly important. Alaska has heightened constitutional protections
for privacy, and under the equal protection, due process, and privacy
analyses, it is likely that courts will continue to grant change of gender
petitions when petitioners have met requirements that serve to protect
the stability of gender as a reliable marker of identity. Courts following
Alaskan precedent, however, are also unlikely to set any restrictions as
onerous as genital sexual reassignment surgery as a hurdle to legal
gender change. Case law around the country is trending toward
protection of GLBT rights. International legal standards are allowing for
more protections for transgender individuals. Jane, and others like Jane,
will likely have the liberty to pursue their personal identity with the
increasing support of legislation and precedent protecting their rights to
privacy and freedom from discrimination based on sex. Alaska is once
again well-situated to be a pioneer in another novel yet quickly growing
field of jurisprudence.

buildings, nuclear power plants, and commercial airplanes. For more
information, see James J. Fazzalaro, The Real ID Act, Enhanced Drivers’ Licenses,
and Related Applications Nov. 16, 2007; Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 731, 797–800 (2008).
150. Bergstedt, supra note 3, at 688 (citing Eric Resnick, Transgender Concerns
Ease on Real ID Rules, Just a Bit, GAY PEOPLE’S CHRONICLE.COM, Feb. 1, 2008,
available at http://www.gaypeopleschronicle.com/stories08/february/0201084.
htm).
151. Id. at 687.
152. See id. at 689 (noting that a naturalized U.S. citizen from a country that
does not amend birth certificates would have trouble changing his or her birth
certificate and subsequently his or her driver’s license).

